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This volume began as an idea that the three of us, as editors, had late in 2014, realising that 
2017 would be the 50th anniversary of Michael Young’s arrival at the Institute of Education 
(now the UCL Institute of Education). In some senses the resulting volume is a Festschrift, 
from the German Fest ‘festival’ and Schrift ‘writing’, a Festschrift being defined as “a 
collection of writings forming a volume for presentation to a well-known scholar on the 
occasion of his attaining a certain age, pinnacle of his career, retirement, etc.” (Dictionary of 
Collective Nouns and Group Terms, 2008). However, from the beginning we wanted the 
volume to be more than hagiography and, without discussing this with Michael, all three of 
us were sure he would want this too. As anyone who knows Michael will appreciate, one of 
the many great things about him is his willingness to discuss cheerfully, and often over a 
drink, almost any aspect of education. At the same time, such conversations have 
considerable rigour. All three of us can attest to the fact that some of the most intellectually 
demanding discussions we have ever had have been with Michael. 
 
The book is divided into three sections. These are not hermetically sealed and it is possible 
to trace cross-cutting themes and a sense of unity between them – not least Young’s 
enduring concern for the place of specialist knowledge in the school curriculum and in 
professional formation, more lately underpinned by social realism. However, the three 
sections provide a convenient and useful means to focus, and especially to draw out what 
we hope are new perspectives on Young’s substantial contribution.  
 
 
1. Sociology 
 
As a discipline, sociology is usually said to have had its origins in 19th century Europe. 
Somewhat ironically, given the subsequent reaction of most sociologists to positivism, the 
great positivist August Comte is generally identified as its founder. Comte, arguably also the 
first philosopher of science, and working in the aftermath of the shock of the French 
Revolution, saw sociology as a discipline that would grow once scientists understood biology 
better. His ideas were fertile ground for such other intellectual giants as Herbert Spencer, 
Marx and Durkheim. 
 
It is Durkheim who can also lay claim to being perhaps the first sociologist of education, and 
his work in this area remains influential to this day, not least to Michael Young himself. 
Durkheim’s view of sociology as the science of institutions makes schools and other sites of 
education a clear focus of research, and early influences on Michael Young’s work can be 
seen in Durkheim and in other educational sociologists such as Basil Bernstein, himself a 
former colleague of Michael’s for many years at the Institute of Education. 
 
As Geoff Whitty describes in his chapter, the ‘old’ sociology of education of the 1950s and 
1960s was largely concerned with mapping social inequalities in education and exploring 
how the cultural features of working class homes and communities militated against 
children from such backgrounds succeeding in school (Craft, 1970). However, this meant 
that “relatively little attention was paid to the content of schooling itself”. Along then came 
Michael Young’s (1971) Knowledge and Control, once described to Michael Reiss by a 
former Chair of one of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) Education Sub-panels as ‘the 
only edited book worth entering in the RAE’. This highly cited and controversial collection of 
essays on the importance of power in the determination of what counts as worthwhile 
school knowledge is often seen, especially by conservative commentators, as a past from 
which Michael Young has wisely retreated. But as Geoff Whitty points out, “Young’s own 
commitment to relativisation, such as it was, might be viewed not as a statement of an 
epistemological position, but as a procedural device for subverting taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the seemingly absolute status of the knowledge which had come to be 
institutionalised in the school curriculum”. 
 
One of the features of Michael Young’s academic life has been his fruitful collaborations 
with others. Nowhere is this greater the case than for the work he has done with Joe Muller. 
In his chapter in this volume, Muller highlights an important aspect of Michael’s personality 
and working methods, one familiar to all who know him yet perhaps not generally 
recognised in the increasing number of written analyses of his work, namely “his 
irrepressible optimism that something better can and must be brought about, that defeats 
are only temporary, that victory may be delayed but is nonetheless on the horizon”. It is 
this, Muller argues, along with “his unfailing generosity of intellectual spirit” that has 
contributed to the warm reception of his ideas, even from those who disagree with them. 
Muller instances how Michael reacted to Moore and Muller (1999) at first by writing in 
partial disagreement and then by co-authoring initially with the first author, Rob Moore (a 
wonderful sociologist of education, now, sadly, no longer alive), and then with the second, 
Joe Muller himself. Muller situates his chapter in a comparison of Michael Young’s work 
with that of Peter Ramus (1515-1567) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626). He argues that Ramus 
was one of the first to discuss knowledge as a living tradition external to individual knowers 
and that Bacon constructed an artful blend of whiggish optimism about knowledge growth 
paired with an argument about the redemptive power of knowledge. Muller concludes that 
“Ramus, Bacon and Young all share a deeper attribute; they were all what Berlin (2013) 
called hedgehogs, scholars and writers who, despite dealing in details were always trying to 
refine the large binding idea that drove their intellectual energies and lifted their 
endeavours above those of their colleagues”. 
 
As befits the personal nature of a Festschrift, John Beck has produced a contribution that “is 
a double homage to two people who have been among the most important intellectual 
influences in my academic life: Michael Young and Charles Bailey”. For those who do not 
know much about Charles Bailey, Beck’s chapter is the place to start. Here, what is worth 
pointing out are the similarities between Knowledge and the Future School (Young et al, 
2014) and Beyond the Present and the Particular (Bailey, 1984). A Beck puts it: 
 
1) First, and perhaps most importantly, both set out and seek to justify a vision of a 
form of education that aims to liberate children and young people from the limited 
horizons of the present and the particular understandings available to them on the 
basis of their everyday experience.  
2) Both accounts contend that giving learners access to a broad range of intrinsically 
valid and worthwhile knowledge is indispensable to such personal and cognitive 
liberation.  
3) Both contend that an education of this kind should constitute the major part of 
compulsory state education;  
4) an education which should be offered to the great majority of students, including 
most of those labelled ‘non-academic’; 
5) throughout the years of compulsory schooling (5-16 in England). 
6) Both accounts offer an ethical as well as an educational set of justifications for these 
proposals. 
7) Both discuss a range of obstacles to realising this vision of education, focusing 
particularly on the challenges of economic instrumentalism and epistemological 
relativism. 
8) Finally, both argue that a certain kind of professional autonomy is indispensable to 
realising the aims set out. 
 
Given that sociology is a subject in the school curriculum, an interesting question arises 
about the extent to which it can be identified as a legitimate form of powerful knowledge. 
In their chapter, Antonia Kupfer and Hugh Lauder examine the British Sociological 
Association (BSA) and the Sociology School Curriculum in England. Using Lukes’ (2005) 
conceptualisation of power, they conclude that the BSA controls not inconsiderable funds, 
undertakes a wide range of activities and has processes and outcomes that are not directly 
influenced by the state. With regards to A level Sociology, study of both textbooks and 
examination questions indicates, encouragingly, that students are being asked to think 
theoretically about social questions and that issues such as those of power and inequality 
are not marginalised.  
 In her chapter Elizabeth Rata begins by noting that “The art of sociology is to make the 
familiar unfamiliar”. Ambitiously, she attempts to connect Michael Young’s work on 
knowledge with theorisations about democracy and concludes “that citizenship is only 
created in education systems which teach the abstracted and objectified knowledge found 
in academic subjects”. Connecting curriculum and pedagogy, she points out that “How 
knowledge is taught depends upon what is taught”. Furthermore, Rata argues that the 
ability to enact one’s citizenship requires an ability to distance oneself from what one is 
considering so as objectify it and make predictions. This is precisely what Michael Young 
advocates in a curriculum based on durable, powerful knowledge rather than one based on 
constructivist principles of everyday experience. Such abilities are more likely to be acquired 
during one’s schooling than at any other time. Rata then asks how it is that democratic 
principles (e.g., “equality, human rights, justice, and the peaceful arbitration of conflict”) 
become internalised as part of a person’s moral code. Again, the answer is seen as being 
found in the valuing of abstract as opposed to everyday knowledge: “A key to this question 
lies in the generalisable and predictive nature of abstract knowledge and the resulting 
potential for universability. The potential to connect imaginatively to people outside one’s 
socio-historical experiences includes the potential to apply the same moral standards to all 
social groups; to universalise in other words”. 
 
While Michael Young is primarily a sociologist, much of his writing is philosophical, relying 
on arguments about epistemology and insisting on normative considerations. Jan Derry 
provides a philosopher of education’s perspective on Michael Young’s work. After siding 
with Michael Young against such identified opponents as Guy Claxton and Ken Robinson, 
Derry identifies what it is that is distinctive about both formal education and academic 
knowledge. As she puts it “For students, initiation into domains of knowledge creates the 
space for their concepts to be actualised in new ways”. Derry’s contention is that such 
initiation is what allow students to think systematically, to come to appreciate how 
particular ideas function and so to access their meaning. She aims to respond to what she 
sees as misconstrued readings of Young’s work which take his emphasis on powerful 
knowledge to be at odds with a concern for pedagogy and human flourishing. Derry 
concludes that “The failure to recognise how knowledge has really developed in history, 
leaving students without access to ‘powerful knowledge’, ends up by serving the interests of 
the powerful more effectively than the propagation of ruling ideas could ever achieve”. 
 
Michael Young’s work has had considerable international impact. In their chapter, Wen Wen 
and Weihe Xie examine the impacts of his curriculum theories on Chinese educational 
research and practices. These impacts have been considerable, in part because Michael 
Young’s shifting accounts of the relative importance of constructivism and objectivity in 
school knowledge are mirroring (or anticipating) comparable debates in China. In particular, 
the recent translation into Chinese of Bringing Knowledge Back In, along with Michael 
Young’s own well-attended visits to China, are helping to challenge the popularity of 
constructivism in Chinese curriculum studies. Wen Wen and Weihe Xie point out that “In 
China, the rationale for social constructivism becoming popular in education is that: it 
stimulates the innovation and creativity of individual teachers, it acknowledges the 
dominant status of teachers and students, it allows for social engagement in the curriculum, 
and it emphasises the subjectivity of practices in educational activities – all of which greatly 
challenges traditional Chinese education and sounds very attractive”. However, the tide 
may now be turning and Michael Young is playing a role in this in no small measure because 
he avoids both traditional mechanical realism and relativistic accounts of knowledge. 
 
 
2. Curriculum Studies 
 
It is perhaps an understatement that “curriculum is a complicated concept” (Jung and Pinar 
2016, 29). From the classical origins of the idea in Europe to its export and the subsequent 
development of the field of curriculum studies in the USA during the twentieth century, its 
meaning has diversified and conceptions of curriculum have multiplied. Matters become 
even more complicated when we take account of national, cultural and historical contexts, 
making international comparisons and discussions notoriously difficult. We might note, 
therefore, that curriculum is not a form of ‘powerful knowledge’ – if universality is what we 
are after with that term. Indeed, Jung and Pinar have argued that “there can be no single or 
universal conception of curriculum, even when concepts seem to coincide terminologically” 
(ibid). And yet, as these authors also state, there are few more significant ideas in 
education. The editors of the monumental Sage Handbook of Curriculum, Pedagogy and 
Assessment do not shirk the implications of such a realisation: ”We would even go so far as 
to say that curriculum (including pedagogy and assessment) is one of the defining areas of 
education as an academic discipline” (Wyse, Hayward and Pandya 2016, 10). 
 
Michael Young might initially agree with most, if not all, of this but would probably wish to 
push things a bit. For example, he might not be happy with Wyse et al’s explicit wish “to 
theorise the interconnections and inseparabilities of pedagogy and assessment” (op cit, 2) 
which explains the parenthetic qualification in their sentence quoted in the paragraph 
above. For Michael, the conceptual distinction between curriculum and pedagogy is very 
important indeed. This is because for him an unwillingness to separate curriculum questions 
from pedagogic matters risks undermining or weakening the key curriculum concern, of 
what to teach. The knowledge-led school is for Michael the answer to the question ‘what 
are schools for?’. The knowledge-led curriculum is what makes schools special places. They 
have the task of inducting children into knowledge and knowledge making – and not just 
any old knowledge, but the best that we have (this claim places an enormous, and probably 
not widely acknowledged, responsibility on teachers). In this way young people may leave 
school with a rounded ‘general education’ (a description used by Tim Oates in his chapter) 
that has provided them with … well, with what?  
 
This is one area (the knowledge contents of a good, general education) where things get 
tricky. ‘Knowing stuff’ is clearly useful, and not just for Trivial Pursuits, but its use a signifier 
of being educated can be quite troubling – as in the case, for example, when Nick Gibb (as 
shadow schools minister before the installation of the 2010 Coalition government, and in 
thrall to E D Hirsch) confidently informed David Lambert that 11 year olds should ‘know’ the 
rivers of England (and the countries of Africa). Apart from the unsettling matter of a 
politician pontificating on the detailed contents of the curriculum, the incident illustrates 
one of the reasons why the Youngian notion of powerful knowledge is helpful and 
productive. It helps distinguish the educational role of knowledge in a way that a Hirschian 
list of core knowledge fails to do. The subtlety of Hirsch, and his concern for cultural literacy 
enabling social justice, is not always acknowledged. Even so, the superficiality of what is 
meant by ‘knowing’ Shakespeare, Pacific Ocean or any of the other 5000 or so facts that 
‘every American needs to know’ (Hirsch, 1987) offers a less satisfactory view of a 
knowledge-led curriculum than one that explicitly asserts the socially produced status of 
knowledge and the role of specialist communities in arbitrating better knowledge. The 
Hirschian list appears given, predetermined and inert, the defining features of what Michael 
and Johan Muller (2010) called a Future 1 curriculum, whereas powerful knowledge, though 
reliable, is contested, dynamic and part of a system of thought which itself can change. The 
latter characterises Future 3: powerful knowledge is more systemic and requires entering 
the world of ideas and the human stories that lie behind their creation, as Michael Reiss 
indicates in his chapter (referring to Isaac Newton). If Hirschian core knowledge is roughly 
aligned with Future 1 curriculum thinking, and powerful knowledge (by definition) 
underpins Future 3 curriculum thinking, we have a useful heuristic that enables the role of 
specialist knowledge in education to be distinguished from the narrow concerns of cultural 
restorationists. However, as Tim Oates points out in his chapter, in comparison with 
outcomes-led approaches to curriculum, the differences between Futures 1 and 3 are not so 
great. The real ‘villain’ is Future 2, and Michael Young would agree with that. 
 
In the end the acquisition of extensive, factual information and the intensive focus on how 
things work are not, of course, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they are probably 
mutually dependent. And it is interesting to note that the retort provoked by Nick Gibb by 
his assertion about ‘the rivers of England’1 some years ago could equally be asked of 
Michael Young. That is, what does ‘knowing’ mean in this context? What is it to know 
powerful scientific knowledge, and how is this different from practical everyday knowledge? 
The questions then keep coming: in the understandable quest to legitimise knowledge in 
curriculum thinking, partly through attacking the over-socialised pedagogic adventure that 
                                                     
1 The response was in fact how many rivers counted as ‘knowing the rivers of England’. Had there been more time we might have also 
discussed whether memorising a list would do, or naming them of a map. And what would we need to know about the rivers? Etcetera. 
characterises Future 2, do we risk sideling pedagogy and (inadvertently) undervaluing 
situated, contextualised practical knowledge and/or ways of knowing? Thus, in his chapter, 
David Scott opens up a philosophical discussion which includes looking at the relationship 
between propositional, scientific and practical, everyday knowledge, including (he argues) 
taking account of the ‘pedagogical’ components in each form. The distinctions between 
powerful knowledge (acquired through school) and everyday knowledge, he concludes, are 
perhaps less stark, or more readily bridged, than might first appear when we focus 
exclusively on what the specialised, disciplinary knowledge component is – as a product, as 
it were. “We have to understand how knowledge is and can be constructed” Scott writes, 
stressing perhaps the key contrast between Future 1 and Future 3 ways of conceptualising 
the curriculum. 
 
In their different ways Michael Reiss, Lyn Yates and David Lambert also explore theoretical 
questions such as these in their chapters. Each of these chapters acknowledges the 
contribution Michael Young has made to their own work: Reiss, through his collaboration 
with John White (and conscious of course of the long-running conversation between Young 
and White about the purpose of schools and the aims of education) and his work as a 
science educationist; Yates through her emergence as a curriculum scholar and her long-
standing concern for equality and social justice, especially in terms of gender; and Lambert 
through his role as a geography educationist which included a stint leading the Geographical 
Association which brought him into lobbying activities and policy discussions about 
curriculum form – and function. Taking a point that Lyn Yates develops more fully in her 
chapter, Michael Young has, rather like David Scott in this volume, spent many years 
‘standing outside’ the day-to-day challenges that face educators, crucially providing “new 
ways of seeing curriculum, knowledge and social forms”. These chapters show how these 
outsider perspectives have been taken up in the respective specialist fields, frequently with 
some difficulty, but always constructively. Tim Oates explains this in terms of the 
fundamental and consistent, progressive strand in Young’s work – which does not lie in the 
simple, banal claim that knowledge is important. It lies in identifying the ‘separate authority’ 
that is associated with the disciplines. David Scott might not agree with this, but it is an 
important claim to make to government ministers who may be tempted to meddle with the 
history curriculum, for example, or invent new subjects to meet political expediency. It is 
also a vital point to make to policy makers tempted to reduce teacher education and 
training to the matter of achieving technical competence. 
 
John Morgan in his chapter, like Lyn Yates and Tim Oates in theirs, focusses on the 
consistently progressive tone to Michael’s work as he has forced the question: what exactly 
is the knowledge to be taught in schools? The question has not yet been fully answered. For 
one thing, appealing to the disciplines-as-authority is not enough because, as Lambert and 
Reiss point out in their chapters, there is no easy pathway to the recontextualisation of 
discipline to school subject. But Morgan introduces another, more fundamental issue which 
was alluded to by Ken Jones in his otherwise generally positive review of Young and Lambert 
(2014). Jones discussed the recontextualising point and indeed other questions pursued by 
several authors in this volume about the “thickest of lines” Michael has tended to draw 
between scientific knowledge and everyday knowledge. But he also suggested that 
Michael’s exploration of curriculum could be seen as a little too ‘pure’ – eschewing issues of 
performativity, accountability, assessment and the degree of teacher autonomy that exists 
today (or indeed in the past). What Morgan does is analyse Michael’s work, from Knowledge 
and Control to the present day, through the lens of capitalism and its successive crises. Thus, 
we learn that Future 2 type knowledge is supportive of modern, fast capital: “it favours 
individualisation, personalisation, flexibility and consumption rather than the more 
traditional Future 1 type knowledge”. In this analysis, Future 3 may be seen as a progressive 
alternative, but one with little chance of taking hold unless teachers – and their leaders – 
see the educational limitations and the social iniquities in Future 2. 
 
And thus we can see glimpses of both Michael’s hugely distinctive contributions to 
curriculum debates, and at the same time several ways in which these constitute work in 
progress. There is no question that Michael’s curiosity and sharp focus on curriculum 
matters has had enormous influence and impact as all the authors in this section testify in 
different ways. However, what these authors also do is decline any temptation to set aside 
their critical faculties and simply celebrate Michael’s contributions. There is more work to be 
done.  
 
3. Professional and Vocational Education 
 
Historically, professional and vocational education have been conceived of as separate and 
different from one another by writers in most advanced industrial counties. People who write 
about professional education tend to maintain there is an epistemological basis to certain 
occupations which requires study in a university prior to qualification, as, for example, in 
engineering, medicine and law (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 2001), whereas people who write 
about vocational education do not, in the main, make a comparable argument about the 
epistemological basis of occupations deemed vocational, as, for example, Agriculture and 
Construction (e.g. Electrical, Plumbing, Carpentry) (Deitmar et al. 2015; Pilz, 2012). 
 
What this split between the professions and vocations has always tended to play down, 
however, is that they are both concerned with the theory-practice relation. Stated another 
way, the relation between disciplinary knowledge and practice is as central to professional as 
much as vocational formation. We can see this from a cursory glance at the literature on 
apprenticeship in European counties (Deitmar et al. 2015; Fuller & Unwin, 2012; Pilz, 2012; 
Rauner & Smith, 2010), and the literature on professional formation (Eraut, 1994; Higgs & 
Titchen, 2001). The primary reason for this, all too often, unacknowledged common concern 
for the theory-practice relation is that the formation of professional and vocational expertise 
(and by extension, identity) presupposes enculturation in occupational practice in 
workplaces, and such enculturation presupposes, in turn, a knowledge base that new entrants 
learn through study in higher or further education or through self-directed learning. Whilst 
the length of study to acquire a degree and licence to practice for occupations deemed 
professional tends to be longer than for an occupation deemed vocational, this difference is 
mainly an issue of regulation through the influence of professional bodies rather than the 
absence of a knowledge base.  
 
For the above reason, Michael Young’s work on vocational and professional knowledge is a 
rare example of someone who appreciates the role that disciplinary knowledge plays in 
professional and vocational formation. To address this common issue, he draws on both of 
Bernstein’s (2000) ‘knowledge’ lexicons: ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ knowledge structures and 
‘singulars’, ‘regions’ and ‘generics’, using the former to discuss the part that disciplinary 
knowledge should play in vocational formation and the latter to distinguish between the part 
that different types of disciplinary knowledge plays in professional formation. Despite never 
explaining the reason for employing different lexicons to address the role of disciplinary 
knowledge in vocational and professional education, Michael makes a broadly similar 
argument, which can be summarised as: professional and vocational education provide 
learners with knowledge they subsequently apply in a field of practice. 
 
The contributors to this section of the book also do not remark on Michael’s different lexicon 
and focus, instead, albeit in very different ways, focusing on Michael’s argument about the 
part knowledge plays in professional and vocational formation, and his relative silence about 
the contribution that contextual factors, for example, institutions, labour market, 
organisation of work, make to this process. Three different responses can be discerned: the 
supportive-extension; the critical; and an alternative vision of the purpose of the theory-
practice relationship. 
 
Stephanie Allais, Jeanne Gamble and Leesa Wheelahan’s chapters represent the first position. 
Allais and Gamble locate Michael’s influence on vocational education (subsequently, 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)) in South Africa by acknowledging 
that in the post-apartheid context the notion of a national qualifications framework (NQF) 
based on a system of learning outcomes for credits achieved was widely seen as a starting 
point for democratising relation between education and work. They then note that Michael, 
when he visited South Africa in the mid 1990s, brought an educational critique of standards, 
outcomes and credits based on his differentiation between everyday and disciplinary-based 
domains of knowledge and between teaching and learning, which foreshadowed problems 
South Africa would face with its NQF framework. They both acknowledge, though in different 
ways, that Michael’s abiding legacy in the South African education policy domain was his 
unwavering and inclusive insistence that knowledge matters in qualifications, in curriculum, 
and in pedagogy; in all forms of academic and professional education but equally so in the 
vocational domain. 
 
Starting her chapter from the premise that disciplinary knowledge is the basis of all formal 
education (academic and vocational), Stephanie Allais pays tribute to the force of Michael’s  
educational critique of learning outcomes and NQFs to set the scene for her discussion of the 
limitations of his’s concept of ‘powerful knowledge’. Allais deepens our understanding of 
challenges associated the attempt in South Africa to overhaul the skill formation system by 
acknowledging that, despite being widely supported dissatisfaction soon set in with the idea 
of learning outcomes, and that Michael’s defence of knowledge rather than outcomes as the 
basis of all curricula has been crucial to her own analysis of why an over-reliance on learning 
outcomes and qualifications in the reform of education is misguided. The complexity of 
technical and vocational education in South Africa is, as Allais highlights, such that an 
emphasis on powerful knowledge, by itself, is unlikely to assist in resolving the problems of 
the vocational curriculum. She argues that vocational curricula are influenced in South Africa, 
and by extension other countries, by contextual factors, such as the economic and social and 
labour market context – and that these factors bring to the fore issues about the relationship 
between power and knowledge. To gain further insight into how to improve curricula and 
strengthen the role of knowledge in vocational curricula requires, Allais concludes, addressing 
the way in which power plays out in the economy, labour market etc. 
 
Leesa Wheelahan also starts from a similar premise. She acknowledges that Michael’s analysis 
of vocational education, via Bernstein’s distinctions between vertical and horizontal 
knowledge structures, led him to question the role of knowledge in education in general and 
to develop his influential argument that the raison d’être of education, including vocational 
education, should be to provide students with access to theoretical knowledge. Building on 
Michael’s analysis of learning outcomes, competency-based training and the policy 
frameworks that accompany these developments as measures that systematically deny 
students access to knowledge, Wheelahan demonstrates the devastating effect their 
introduction has had on the public provider of vocational education, technical and further 
education (TAFE) institutes in Australia. She concludes that this has occurred because 
successive Australian governments have based the reform of TAFE on the principle of 
relevance and hybridity, which have underpinned global arguments about the purpose of 
vocational education, rather than employing the principle of insularity to provide students 
with access to the boundaries between different kinds of knowledge, and using their 
understanding of disciplinary boundaries as the basis for making connection between 
different forms of knowledge. Wheelahan draws on literature associated with ‘new 
institutionalism’, which is not usually associated with the form of social realist scholarship 
Michael advocates, to extend his argument about how vocational education can provide 
access to knowledge. She argues that the principle of insularity also needs to be applied to 
demonstrate why public vocational education colleges, rather than private training 
organisations, are the institutional enabling mechanism necessary for the codification, 
elaboration and institutionalisation of knowledge and skills needed for work, not now, but in 
the future. 
 
Jeanne Gamble extends Michael’s theoretical engagement with the notion of vocational 
knowledge, using his paper Conceptualising vocational knowledge: some theoretical 
considerations, which was included in a South African volume they co-edited, as a starting 
point (Young & Gamble, 2006). The book brings together different critiques of NQFs and 
competence as curriculum basis in South Africa, and serves as an early legacy of Michael’s 
scholarly influence and collegiality in encouraging and facilitating South African researchers’ 
entry into international fields of scholarship and research in the sociology of education. In this 
chapter Michael and Jeanne both draw on the sociologist Basil Bernstein’s work, albeit in 
different ways, to construct alternative conceptions of the theory-practice relation in 
vocational education. Gamble argues that Michael’s sociological reading should be 
understood as constructing the ‘high road’ of vocational education and training (VET) within 
a traditional liberal education perspective that invokes earlier traditions of mathematics and 
science-based instruction as the basis of technical education. Her reading retrieves crafts and 
trades as early prototypes of vocational education and leads theoretically to a ‘middle road’ 
in vocational curriculum terms. The ‘middle’ road, which does not start with formal 
knowledge encoded in a subject discipline curriculum in either pure or applied form, refers to 
specialised knowledge transmitted in and through practice. The two interpretations are at 
odds in their respective positions on the recontextualising logic of the vocational curriculum 
and what this means for ‘practice’ as a curriculum component but they stand in a 
complementary relation in their opposition to the ‘low road’ of standards-based curriculum 
prescriptions. The overall argument is that ongoing theorisation would need to take account 
of both these ‘knowledge’ arguments, to deepen possibilities in relation to both the ‘theory’ 
and practice’ dimensions of curricula that prepare for work and to ensure that technical and 
vocational education (TVET), as a study option, does not preclude rather than include.  
 
In contrast, David Guile argues that Michael has in his own writing and in his work with Johan 
Muller about the professions over-stretched his ‘knowledge’ argument in three main ways. 
They are: (i) maintaining that entry to all professions is via the study of a degree that has a 
close relation to a field of practice when this relationship only applies to a limited number of 
professions; (ii) glossing over the constitutive role of work in the development of professional 
expertise in ways that render the term ‘field of practice’ deeply problematic; and (iii) 
relinquishing his earlier concern in The Curriculum of the Future (Young, 1988) to consider the 
implications that changes in work, especially technological changes, may have for the design 
and delivery of professional education. This leads Guile to conclude that there is, in Michael’s 
work, in the 21st century a slightly nostalgic flavour about, and overly restricted analysis of, 
knowledge and the professions, especially when compared to the challenges that a number 
of writers have recently suggested lie waiting in store for the professions and their particular 
forms of specialisation, for example, to be replaced by robots (Ford, 2015; Susskind & 
Susskind, 2015) or to work in reduced numbers with robots (Brynjolfson & McAfee, 2012) – 
where the term robot is used as a shorthand for Artificial Intelligence. 
 
Guile argues that by, firstly, adhering to Durkheim’s legacy rather than the spirit of his 
sociological inquiry, Michael has been overly faithful to Bernstein’s knowledge lexicon when 
considering the relationship between knowledge and the professions. Secondly, in 
overlooking the emergence of ‘immaterial’ labour associated with the new ‘cognitive’ division 
of labour (Moulier Boutang, 2011) he has paid scant regard to what the chapter refers to as 
interprofessional tacit knowledge which constitutes the knowledge-in-use in the 
aforementioned division of labour. Michael therefore lacks a lexicon to describe the forms of 
knowledge professionals produce in intra-and inter-professional groupings at work and the 
way in which this resource, which is embedded in technology (i.e. software design) and 
accessed through technology (i.e. digital repositories), as well as embodied in individuals’ 
professional practice, can be shared and, in the process, support professional formation. Guile 
concludes by outlining a recontextualised (i.e. Cultural-Historical rather than Bernstein-based) 
model of professional formation which, unlike the trinary, presents a role for all forms of 
knowledge as constitutive elements in professional formation and supports the development 
of forms of professional practice commensurate with the challenges associated with 
immaterial labour. 
 
In his chapter, Ken Spours introduces a conception of the theory-practice relationship that 
rarely surfaces in debates about such issues and, in the process, develops a hybrid of the 
preceding interpretations of Michael’s work on vocational and professional education. 
Starting with Michael’s most recent argument about specialization and the role of universities 
and schools in the production and mediation of specialist knowledge in defining the purposes 
of education, Spours gives Michael’s Durkheimian and Bernsteinian perspective a Gramscian 
twist. Discussing the strengths and limitation of two versions of the general intellect – classical 
Marxist Techno-Economic and Liberal Rationalist – in relation to Gramsci’s theory of politics 
and concepts of hegemony, historical bloc and common sense/good sense in the conditions 
of ‘New Times’, Spours articulates a third version – the ‘Organic Intellect’. In other words, 
someone who is committed to using the interface between theory and practice as a resource 
to address the global and national socio-economic challenges of the 21st century. He then 
uses this multi-dimensional concept to reflect on Michael’s approach to specialization and 
the curriculum of the future, arguing that earlier aspects of his work on ‘connective 
specialization’ (Young, 1998) hold as much promise as his recent theories of the role of 
knowledge in education in the attainment of Futures 3; that is, a curriculum predicated on 
boundary maintaining and boundary crossing. Spours’ chapter concludes by suggesting that 
Michael should consider six conceptual movements related to his most recent work on 
knowledge to take his work beyond a defence of the disciplines to engage with the ‘new 
radical horizontalities’ in 21st century advanced industrial societies. These progressions could, 
according to Spours, constitute a prospective ‘Fourth Period’ for Michael which he could apply 
creatively not only to secondary education, but also to professional and political life more 
broadly. 
 
The above responses to Michael’s work may appear, at first sight, to be in conflict with or 
diverging from one another; they are, however, closely related since each writer is 
highlighting different limitations of, while recognising the value of, Michael’s knowledge 
argument. They are all encouraging him to develop a further phase of work and have 
suggested four different ways of doing so. These are to explore: the institutional conditions 
for the teaching of knowledge; the criteria to underpin a knowledge-practice curriculum; the 
relationship between post-disciplinary development of knowledge in workplaces and 
disciplinary knowledge; and the development of organic intellectuals.  
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